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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN SECTION 8 
HOUSING VOUCHER TERMINATION 
HEARINGS 
Abstract: The federal Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program pro-
vides critical housing subsidy assistance to over two million low-income 
families in the United States. Each year some of these families have their 
Section 8 voucher assistance terminated based solely on uncorroborated 
hearsay evidence relied on by local public housing authorities to prove 
various program violations. State and federal courts have reached differ-
ing conclusions as to whether these terminations violate families’ proce-
dural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal 
regulations governing the program. This Note argues that terminations 
based solely on hearsay evidence violate procedural due process and the 
federal regulations. Applying the balancing test laid out by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976, this Note concludes that Sec-
tion 8 voucher terminations may not be based solely on hearsay evidence 
without affording families the right to confront and cross-examine those 
adverse witnesses who provide the evidence relied on by the housing au-
thority. Further, this Note urges that the federal regulations be amended 
to make this requirement explicit. 
Introduction 
 The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program was established 
in 1974 and is now the largest federal low-income housing assistance 
program in the United States.1 Overseen by the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and administered by state or 
local public housing agencies (“PHAs”), the program helps families 
afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing and currently assists more 
than two million households.2 The PHAs provide vouchers to eligible 
low-income families, who, in turn, use them to rent housing in the pri-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Introduction to the Housing Vouch-
er Program 1 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-15-09hous.pdf. See generally 42 
U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2006); 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2009). 
2 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1) (“In the HUD Housing Choice Voucher Program . . . HUD 
pays rental subsidies so eligible families can afford decent, safe and sanitary housing.”); Ctr. 
on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 1, 8. 
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vate market they might otherwise not be able to afford.3 Voucher re-
cipients generally pay thirty percent of their monthly income toward 
the rent, and the voucher subsidizes the remainder.4
 PHAs have the right to terminate Section 8 housing voucher assis-
tance when families violate lease terms for their subsidized units or 
other program regulations.5 For example, PHAs may terminate if they 
discover individuals residing at a subsidized unit without prior ap-
proval, if a family is absent from its unit for a prolonged period of time, 
if a family member engages in criminal activity or alcohol abuse, or if a 
family member commits fraud in connection with the program.6 Fami-
lies have the right to receive notice stating the reasons for the PHA’s 
decision to terminate assistance and the right to request an “informal 
hearing” prior to the termination.7
 Families in the Section 8 voucher program have a critical interest 
in the outcome of these termination hearings, as the loss of a voucher 
can result in homelessness.8 Those who have their vouchers terminated 
also face barriers to obtaining new vouchers.9 First, PHAs have the dis-
cretion to find families ineligible for another voucher if any member 
was previously terminated from the voucher program.10 Also, due to 
funding shortages, many PHAs have voucher waiting lists of several 
years or have closed their waiting lists to new families entirely.11 Cur-
                                                                                                                      
 
3 Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 1. Local housing agencies 
administering the Section 8 voucher program set the precise income requirements for 
admission to the program in their area. Id. at 2. Agencies are required to set the maximum 
family income between fifty and eighty percent of local area median income. Id. In addi-
tion, at least seventy-five percent of the families admitted to the program each year must 
qualify as “extremely low-income” households, with incomes at or below thirty percent of 
the area median income. Id. at 2–3. 
4 Id. at 4. 
5 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(a)–(e). 
6 See id. 
7 See id. § 982.555(a)(1)(v)–(vi), (a)(2), (c); see also Nat’l Hous. Law Project, HUD 
Housing Programs: Tenants’ Rights § 1.3.5.1, at 1/39 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that the 
main sources of rights for tenants in the voucher program are the statute, the HUD regula-
tions, an annual contribution contract between HUD and the PHA, a Housing Assistance 
Payments contract between the PHA and the tenant’s landlord, the lease, and state and 
local law). 
8 See Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 2, 7. 
9 See id. at 1. 
10 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1) (“The PHA may at any time deny program assistance for 
an applicant . . . . If a PHA has ever terminated assistance under the program for any 
member of the family.”). 
11 Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 1; see Nat’l Hous. Law Pro-
ject, supra note 7, § 1.3.5.1, at 1/37 (“Generally, the demand for Vouchers has so severely 
outstripped availability that it is common to first have to apply just to be on the PHA’s 
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rently, demand for Section 8 vouchers far exceeds the supply, and only 
one in four families eligible for vouchers receives federal housing assis-
tance.12
 Given the very high stakes involved in the outcome of termination 
hearings, many housing advocates have questioned whether families 
receive adequate procedural due process protections at the hearings to 
ensure that PHAs do not terminate vouchers erroneously.13 One possi-
ble source of error is the frequent PHA practice of relying on hearsay 
evidence at voucher termination hearings in order to prove lease viola-
tions.14 For example, PHAs often introduce statements given by 
                                                                                                                      
 
Voucher waiting list.”). The average waiting time for voucher assistance is especially long in 
large cities. See Nat’l Hous. Law Project, supra note 7, § 2.3, at 2/23. For example, in 
1999, the average wait for a voucher was ten years in Los Angeles and Newark, eight years 
in New York City, seven years in Houston, and five years in Memphis and Chicago. Id. 
12 Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 1. The demand for Section 8 
vouchers is likely to continue to rise due to the current economic downturn in the United 
States. See Barbara Sard, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Number of Homeless 
Families Climbing Due to Recession 10 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/ 
1-8-09hous.pdf. Based on the relationship between increases in the unemployment rate 
and increases in poverty in the last three recessions, experts expect that the number of 
families in the U.S. living at below half of the poverty line will rise by 900,000 to 1.1 million 
due to the current downturn. Id. at 4. Families living at this level of poverty are at the 
highest risk of homelessness because they will have the greatest difficulty paying their rent, 
and thus may need to turn to voucher assistance. Id. Although some families leave the 
voucher program each year, “fewer families are likely to become independent of federal 
housing assistance during an economic downturn, which means fewer new families can be 
assisted now than would usually be the case.” Id. at 10. Also, experts have noted that the 
2009 federal Omnibus Appropriations Act failed to provide sufficient funding to renew all 
of the vouchers used by families in 2008, falling short by up to $400 million, which also 
makes vouchers more difficult to obtain for new families. See Ctr. on Budget & Policy 
Priorities, Update on HUD Funding for 2009, at 1–3 (2009), available at http://www. 
cbpp.org/files/3-13-09housprac.pdf. 
13 See Eric Dunn et al., Housing Choice Voucher Termination Hearings: Best Practices for Pub-
lic Housing Agencies, Clearinghouse Rev., July–Aug. 2008, at 134, 135 (“Since voucher 
termination tends to cause catastrophic consequences, helping families contest unjust 
terminations is already a top priority among legal aid providers.”). Once accepted into the 
Section 8 voucher program, families have an entitlement to continue their participation 
until they are over income or violate program requirements, and they cannot be termi-
nated from the program without procedural protections. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.552, 982.555; 
Nat’l Hous. Law Project, supra note 7, § 14.4.2, at 14/129. Although HUD did not origi-
nally provide for procedural due process protections for families facing termination, after 
years of litigation it promulgated regulations providing basic protections in 1984. See Sec-
tion 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program; Existing Housing, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,215, 
12,224–31 (Mar. 29, 1984); Nat’l Hous. Law Project, supra note 7, § 14.4.2, at 14/129. 
14 See C. Martin Lawyer III, Eleventh Circuit Limits Section 8 Housing Subsidy Terminations 
and Defines and Applies “Burden of Persuasion,” Clearinghouse Rev., July–Aug. 2008, at 194, 
194 (noting that many PHAs and hearing officers fully accept hearsay evidence as grounds 
for termination even without any corroborating direct testimony). Hearsay is a statement, 
whether consisting of a verbal assertion or nonverbal assertive conduct, other than one 
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neighbors or landlords to a PHA employee, or statements contained in 
newspaper articles or police reports.15 It is common practice for many 
PHAs across the country to give lists of subsidized families’ addresses to 
criminal reporting companies who are paid to monitor police reports 
for activity at these addresses.16 PHAs then send automatic notices of 
termination to these families based on information in the police re-
ports.17 These notices may claim that there has been illegal activity at a 
family’s dwelling or that the family has an unauthorized person living 
in the unit if a person listed in the police report is not also on the 
lease.18 PHAs then introduce copies of these police reports as evidence 
at the informal hearing as a basis for termination.19
 This practice of relying on hearsay evidence to support a voucher 
termination has led to litigation in state and federal courts around the 
country as families challenge voucher terminations based on hearsay.20 
Voucher recipients argue that basing a termination decision solely on 
hearsay evidence is a violation of their procedural due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it denies them the chance 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them.21 PHAs counter 
                                                                                                                      
 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, that is offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Black’s Law Dictionary 739 (8th ed. 2004). Tes-
timony may not be admitted in a court unless it is or has been subject to testing by cross-
examination or the opportunity for cross-examination, unless it falls under some kind of 
exception. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence list twenty-three exceptions where hearsay 
statements may be admitted regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify, and 
five exceptions where statements may be admitted even if the declarant is unavailable. Fed. 
R. Evid. 803, 804. 
15 See Edgecomb v. Hous. Auth. of Vernon, 824 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D. Conn. 1993); Cos-
ta v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 881 N.E.2d 800, 809 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 903 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 2009); see also Lawyer, supra note 14, at 194. 
16 Lawyer, supra note 14, at 194. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315; Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
21 See Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 595 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (E.D.N.C. 2008); 
Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 802; see also Dunn et al., supra note 13, at 143 (arguing that PHAs 
should adopt policies that make hearsay evidence insufficient by itself to support a voucher 
termination); William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 829, 835–36 (2005) (noting that because the goal of relaxing eviden-
tiary standards in administrative proceedings is “to encourage broad admission of evi-
dence, including hearsay, there frequently can be situations where a respondent’s ability to 
test the evidence, particularly hearsay, may be lessened so much that he or she is denied 
due process,” and therefore “reviewing courts frequently determine specific evidence is-
sues on constitutional requirements rather than statutory or regulatory requirements”). 
Due process is a recurring issue that must be addressed in the context of hearsay evidence 
because hearsay inherently involves the absence of cross-examination. Kuehnle, supra, at 
2010] Hearsay Evidence in Section 8 Housing Voucher Termination Hearings 521 
that under HUD regulations the formal rules of evidence do not apply 
to voucher termination hearings and, therefore, hearsay alone can be 
sufficient evidence upon which to base a voucher termination.22
 Courts have come to widely differing conclusions as to whether 
procedural due process permits PHAs to terminate families based on 
hearsay evidence alone, or whether it requires that families have the 
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who made statements 
that PHAs relied on in deciding to terminate.23 This Note examines 
what evidence should be sufficient to terminate a family from the Sec-
tion 8 voucher program, specifically whether a termination can be 
based solely on hearsay evidence without violating the right to due 
process.24 Part I of this Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence regarding the dictates of procedural due process in adminis-
trative hearings regarding the deprivation of public benefits.25 Part II 
reviews the HUD regulations governing the use of evidence in Section 
8 voucher termination hearings and goes on to examine the variety of 
approaches federal and state courts have taken in determining what 
level of procedural due process the regulations and the Supreme 
Court’s decisions require in these hearings.26 Finally, Part III argues 
that in the context of voucher termination hearings, the HUD regula-
tions and Supreme Court precedent require that termination decisions 
not be based solely on uncorroborated hearsay without affording fami-
lies the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
and suggests that HUD consider amending its regulations to make this 
requirement explicit.27
                                                                                                                      
857; see also Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the 
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 976 (2006) (noting, in the context of formal 
court proceedings, that if adversaries are allowed to substitute hearsay for available live 
testimony, “[m]ost jurists would agree that the principal harm would be the loss of cross-
examination”). 
22 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2009) (“Evidence may be considered without regard 
to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.”). 
23 Compare Gammons v. Mass. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 502 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165–66 
(D. Mass. 2007), with Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
24 See infra notes 28–271 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 28–83 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 84–203 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 204–271 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Deprivation of Public Benefits: Defining  
Procedural Due Process 
 This Part briefly reviews the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding the requirements of procedural due process as 
applied to hearings involving the deprivation of public benefits.28 First, 
this Part discusses the Court’s landmark ruling that a pretermination 
evidentiary hearing is required in the case of welfare recipients.29 It 
then reviews the Court’s narrowing of this requirement in the context 
of applicants for federal disability benefits.30 Finally, this Part examines 
the Court’s articulation of the current test applied in determining what 
aspects of procedural due process should be incorporated in a hearing 
regarding the deprivation of public benefits.31
A. The Due Process Revolution: Goldberg v. Kelly and Its Progeny 
 Although administrative hearings are informal and the rules of 
evidence are not strictly applied, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
due process requires basic procedural safeguards in hearings involving 
the deprivation of public benefits.32 In 1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the 
Court issued its landmark decision pronouncing these safeguards.33 In 
Goldberg, the Court had to decide whether New York State’s termination 
of a recipient’s public assistance payments without a prior evidentiary 
hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.34 Under existing New York procedures, only a posttermination 
hearing was available to public assistance recipients.35 The Court held 
that, in the welfare context, a posttermination hearing alone was insuf-
ficient and that due process also required a pretermination evidentiary 
hearing.36
 The Court started with the premise that the extent to which welfare 
recipients must be afforded due process depends on the extent to which 
they may be “condemned to suffer grievous loss” and whether their in-
terest in avoiding this loss outweighed the government’s interest in 
                                                                                                                      
28 See infra notes 32–83 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 32–54 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 64–83 and accompanying text. 
32 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 264 (1970). 
33 See id. 
34 Id. at 255–56; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
35 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256–57. 
36 Id. at 264. 
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summary adjudication.37 It then weighed the recipient’s interest in re-
ceiving welfare against the government’s interest in conserving its fiscal 
and administrative resources.38 In terms of the recipient’s interest, the 
Court noted that because welfare provides a means of accessing vital 
food, clothing, housing and medical care, a “crucial factor” in determin-
ing whether a pretermination hearing was necessary was that waiting for 
a posttermination hearing “may deprive an eligible recipient of the very 
means by which to live while he waits.”39 As for the government’s inter-
est, the Court observed that it was also in the government’s interest to 
avoid improperly terminating eligible recipients’ welfare benefits, not-
ing that public assistance was not “mere charity” but rather a means of 
promoting the dignity and well-being of all persons within the United 
States.40
 Although the government had an interest in conserving its re-
sources, that interest was outweighed by the competing interest of re-
cipients as well as the government in not having the benefits terminated 
erroneously.41 The risk of grievous loss to recipients was simply too 
high.42
 In Goldberg, the Court also detailed the required form of the pre-
termination hearing.43 It noted that the hearing did not need to be in 
the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, and that both the govern-
ment and welfare recipients had an interest in reaching a resolution 
swiftly.44 Thus, a hearing could be limited to minimal procedural safe-
guards adapted to the particular situation of welfare recipients and the 
nature of the issues to be resolved.45
 The Court decided that procedural due process in the case of wel-
fare recipients required: (1) timely and adequate notice to the recipi-
ent of the reasons for the termination; (2) an opportunity to confront 
any adverse witnesses and present arguments and evidence orally; (3) 
an opportunity to be represented by counsel at the recipient’s expense; 
(4) an impartial decisionmaker; and (5) a decision that rests solely on 
the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing, and states the rea-
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. at 262–63 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
38 See id. at 263, 265–66. 
39 See id. at 264. 
40 Id. at 264–65. 
41 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265–66. 
42 See id. at 263–66. 
43 See id. at 266–67. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 267. 
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sons for the determination and upon what evidence the determination 
relies.46
 The Court was influenced by the fact that a hearing decision based 
merely on written submissions would be unsatisfactory because recipi-
ents’ credibility and veracity would often be at issue; therefore, it stated 
that recipients should be allowed to present positions orally, and to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses.47 Relying on its 1959 deci-
sion in Greene v. McElroy, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that where 
important decisions turn on questions of fact, procedural due process 
requires the opportunity to confront and cross-examine.48 In Greene, 
the Court noted that the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination have ancient roots and that the Court had zealously pro-
tected them from erosion not only in criminal cases but also in “all 
types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.”49 
The Court concluded that welfare recipients, therefore, had to have an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by 
the welfare department and that the absence of this opportunity was 
“fatal” to the constitutional adequacy of the hearing procedures.50
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 267–68, 270–71. 
47 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269. 
48 Id. at 269–70; see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959). 
49 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 (quoting Greene, 360 U.S. at 496–97). In Greene, the Court 
held that a government agency was not authorized to deprive a government contractor of 
his job after a proceeding where he was not provided with the safeguards of confrontation 
and cross-examination. See 360 U.S. at 508. In Goldberg, the Court found Greene highly rele-
vant to its analysis of whether relying on hearsay in the form of a secondhand presentation 
of evidence by a welfare caseworker would violate a recipient’s due process rights. Goldberg, 
397 U.S. at 270. It devoted significant space in its decision to a quotation from Greene that 
read: 
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. 
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures the individual, 
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence 
used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that 
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the 
case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence 
consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, 
in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intol-
erance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the re-
quirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. 
They find expression in the Sixth Amendment. . . . This Court has been zealous 
to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases 
. . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under 
scrutiny. 
Id. (quoting Greene, 360 U.S. at 496–97). 
50 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268, 270. 
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 Although Goldberg dealt specifically with the termination of welfare 
benefits, lower courts soon began applying its reasoning to require more 
protections in hearings for other types of public benefits, including 
housing.51 For example, in 1970, in Escalera v. New York City Housing Au-
thority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that ten-
ants in public housing projects had stated a claim for relief where the 
PHA denied them the opportunity to confront and cross-examine par-
ties who supplied information upon which the authority based its ad-
verse action.52 The court, relying on Goldberg, stated that if a PHA did 
not want to disclose the names of those who provided the information 
or have tenants confront them at a hearing because it could cause hos-
tility within housing projects, then the PHA could not base its determi-
nation on that information.53 The Second Circuit thus gave early sup-
port to the idea that the Goldberg due process analysis could apply to 
cases involving the deprivation of housing assistance as well as welfare 
benefits.54
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Application of Goldberg to Hearsay Evidence 
 Soon after its decision in Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court had to 
determine whether procedural due process could permit the depriva-
tion of public benefits based on hearsay evidence.55 In 1971, in Richard-
son v. Perales, the Court held that a decision could be based on hearsay 
in the context of applications for Social Security disability assistance, 
and this remains the Court’s leading case regarding the admissibility of 
hearsay in administrative hearings.56
 In Perales, the government denied the plaintiff’s application for 
disability benefits based solely on examining physicians’ written medi-
cal reports; the plaintiff asserted that his inability to confront and cross-
examine these physicians at the application hearing violated his right to 
due process.57 The Court, however, held that a written report by li-
censed physicians who examined a claimant could be received into evi-
                                                                                                                      
51 See Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861–62 (2d Cir. 1970). 
52 See id. This case was decided prior to the establishment of the Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, and thus its holding was limited to evictions from public hous-
ing projects, although its reasoning has been applied in later cases involving voucher ter-
minations. See id.; Edgecomb v. Hous. Auth. of Vernon, 824 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Conn. 
1993). 
53 Escalera, 425 F.2d at 862–63 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270). 
54 See id. 
55 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 402 (1971). 
56 Id. at 402; Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 854. 
57 See Perales, 402 U.S. at 392–95, 401. 
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dence at the administrative hearing; although hearsay, the report was 
sufficient to support a finding against the plaintiff where he had not 
subpoenaed the reporting physicians and, therefore, denied himself 
the opportunity to cross-examine them.58
 The Court based its decision on a number of factors that it be-
lieved would assure the underlying reliability and probative value of the 
evidence including: the routine, standard and unbiased nature of the 
physicians’ reports, which were based on personal examinations of the 
applicant involving accepted medical procedures and tests; the number 
and range of the medical examinations undertaken; the lack of any in-
consistency among the reports; the claimant’s failure to take advantage 
of his opportunity to subpoena the physicians; the past judicial recogni-
tion of the inherent reliability of physician reports; and the magnitude 
of the cost of providing live medical testimony at all Social Security dis-
ability hearings.59
 The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims that Goldberg required an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the 
hearing, distinguishing his situation from that of a welfare recipient.60 
The Court pointed out that the plaintiff’s case did not involve termina-
tion of benefits already granted, as Goldberg had, and that the plaintiff 
had the opportunity to subpoena the physicians for cross-examination, 
but failed to do so.61 It also noted that the authors of the reports were 
known, and that the “specter of questionable credibility and veracity 
[was] not present” the way it was in Goldberg because of the physicians’ 
training and reputations.62 Thus the Court established that hearsay evi-
dence alone could form substantial evidence sufficient to support an 
adverse finding in a hearing regarding an application for disability 
                                                                                                                      
58 Id. at 402. The Court concluded: 
[A] written report by a licensed physician who has examined the claimant 
and who sets forth in his report medical findings in his area of competence 
may be received as evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay 
character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence of 
opposing direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, 
may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing ex-
aminer adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not exercised his right 
to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with the 
opportunity for cross-examination of the physician. 
Id. 
59 See id. at 402–06. 
60 Id. at 406–07. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 407. 
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benefits, thereby validating a set of administrative procedures much 
narrower than that outlined in Goldberg.63
C. The Current Test: Mathews v. Eldridge 
 In 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the U.S. Supreme Court laid out 
the current test for determining what the specific dictates of proce-
dural due process require for a given hearing regarding the deprivation 
of public benefits.64 There, the Court considered a plaintiff’s claim that 
the termination of his Social Security disability benefits violated his 
right to procedural due process where he did not receive a full preter-
mination evidentiary hearing of the kind contemplated in Goldberg.65 
The plaintiff in Mathews had been receiving disability benefits when the 
state agency asked him to complete a medical questionnaire about his 
condition.66 He stated that his condition had not improved, and pro-
vided the names of his physicians.67 The state agency then obtained 
reports from these doctors and determined that the plaintiff was no 
longer disabled.68 The plaintiff was allowed to respond in writing with 
additional information, but the agency again determined he was not 
disabled and was no longer eligible to receive disability benefits.69
 The Court held that these administrative procedures were consti-
tutionally adequate in the case of termination of benefits of a Social 
Security disability recipient, and that a hearing like that in Goldberg was 
not required.70 It emphasized that due process is not a technical con-
ception; rather, it is flexible and varies according to the particular situa-
tion.71 It held that identification of the specific requirements of due 
                                                                                                                      
63 Perales, 402 U.S. at 407. The Court in Perales defined “substantial evidence” as “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
Id. at 401 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
64 See 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). The Mathews decision was a turning point in the 
Court’s approach to due process requirements in administrative hearings as it had devel-
oped in Greene, Goldberg, and Perales, particularly as such requirements related to hearsay. 
Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 865–68 (noting that in Mathews the Court “revisited the due 
process requirements in a way that narrowed Goldberg and put the cross-examination/ 
hearsay issue more in the Perales mode,” because “balancing is required to determine what 
due process is to be afforded, and one of the considerations is what level of procedural 
testing of truth is needed”). 
65 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325. 
66 Id. at 323–24. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 324. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 325–26. 
71 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
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process in any particular case required consideration of three factors: 
(1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of that interest under current procedures and 
any probable value of additional or substitute procedures; and (3) the 
government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.”72
 Applying these three factors to the case of a Social Security disabil-
ity recipient, the Court distinguished the Mathews plaintiff’s situation 
from that of the Goldberg plaintiffs, noting that Goldberg was the only case 
where it had held that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial 
was necessary.73 In terms of the first factor, or the private interest af-
fected, the Court observed that eligibility for disability benefits like 
those received by the plaintiff was unrelated to financial need; in con-
trast, the welfare recipients in Goldberg were “on the very margin of sub-
sistence.”74 Thus, the private interest of the recipient as measured by the 
degree of the potential deprivation was generally likely to be less in a 
disability benefits termination case than in a welfare termination case.75
 As for the second factor, the Court noted that the risk of errone-
ous deprivation of disability benefits and the probable value of addi-
tional procedures were also lower than they would be for welfare bene-
fits.76 The Court stated that the central consideration in evaluating the 
second factor is the nature of the particular inquiry.77 In the case of 
disability benefits, eligibility depends on recipients showing they are 
unable to work by reason of a “medically determinable” impairment.78 
The Court reasoned that a medical assessment is more sharply focused 
and easier to document than the typical welfare eligibility determina-
tion because, as in Perales, the decision is based on routine and unbi-
ased reports by physician specialists.79 By contrast, in a welfare case a 
much wider variety of information is relevant to the eligibility inquiry 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 335. 
73 Id. at 333–34. 
74 Id. at 340. 
75 Id. at 341. The Court noted that if disabled workers did in fact face significant finan-
cial hardship due to an erroneous termination, the workers would still be able to apply for 
other forms of government assistance like welfare if they fell below the subsistence level. 
Id. at 342. 
76 Id. at 343–45. 
77 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 343–44 (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 404). 
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and evaluating witness credibility and veracity is often critical.80 Be-
cause assessments based on routine written medical reports rarely in-
volve issues of credibility and veracity, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
is low and the value of allowing a full evidentiary hearing or oral testi-
mony would be minimal.81
 Applying the third factor, the Court decided that the government’s 
interest was significant due to the fiscal and administrative burden of 
increasing the number of hearings and the cost of providing benefits to 
workers pending a decision.82 Thus, the government’s interest in con-
serving fiscal and administrative resources outweighed the private in-
terest of a Social Security disability recipient and the low risk of an er-
roneous deprivation; therefore, an evidentiary hearing like the one 
described in Goldberg was not required to comport with procedural due 
process.83
II. Procedural Due Process Limitations on the Use of Hearsay 
in Section 8 Voucher Termination Hearings:  
Federal and State Interpretations 
 This Part examines the HUD regulations that govern the use of 
evidence in Section 8 voucher termination hearings and the way various 
federal and state courts have construed these regulations to determine 
what due process requires in these hearings.84 First, this Part reviews the 
HUD regulations concerning what evidence may be considered in a 
voucher termination hearing.85 Next, it examines federal and state cases 
where courts have found that the regulations and procedural due proc-
ess require termination decisions be based on more than uncorrobo-
rated hearsay.86 This Part then looks at federal and state cases where 
courts have reached the opposite conclusion, interpreting the regula-
tions and procedural due process to allow decisions based exclusively on 
uncorroborated hearsay.87 Finally, this Part describes a recent federal 
appellate case and subsequent decisions interpreting it to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 344–45. 
82 See id. at 347–48. 
83 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. 
84 See infra notes 89–203 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 103–133 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 134–155 and accompanying text. 
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the continuing lack of clarity surrounding what evidence is sufficient to 
terminate a Section 8 voucher.88
A. Hearsay and HUD Regulations Governing Section 8 Voucher  
Termination Hearings 
 The HUD regulations governing Section 8 voucher termination 
hearings provide tenants with several basic procedural protections.89 
These protections include the right to prompt written notice of the de-
cision to terminate, including the reasons for the decision, the oppor-
tunity to request an informal hearing, the right to representation by a 
lawyer or other representative at the family’s expense, and the right to 
an impartial hearing officer.90 The regulations also provide guidance as 
to the admissibility of evidence and burden of proof at the informal 
hearing.91 The applicable section of the Code of Federal Regulations 
reads: 
(5) Evidence. The PHA and the family must be given the op-
portunity to present evidence, and may question any wit-
nesses. Evidence may be considered without regard to admis-
sibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial 
proceedings. 
(6) Issuance of decision. The person who conducts the hearing 
must issue a written decision, stating briefly the reasons for 
the decision. Factual determinations relating to the individual 
circumstances of the family shall be based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence presented at the hearing. A copy of the 
hearing decision shall be furnished promptly to the family.92
Thus, the regulations establish that the rules of evidence do not apply 
in Section 8 voucher termination hearings and they contain no explicit 
ban on hearsay evidence.93 Also, although the regulations provide that 
                                                                                                                      
88 See infra notes 156–203 and accompanying text. 
89 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)–(e) (2009). 
90 See id. § 982.555(c), (e)(3), (e)(4)(i). 
91 Id. § 982.555(e)(5)–(6). 
92 Id. The HUD voucher guidebook advising PHAs on the administration of the pro-
gram adds little to the regulations, simply stating: “Both the PHA and the family must be 
given the opportunity to present evidence, and each may question any witnesses. Evidence 
may be considered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable 
to judicial proceedings.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Voucher Program Guide-
book, Housing Choice 7420.10G § 16.5, at 16-5 (2001), available at http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/adm/hudclips/guidebooks/7420.10G/7420g16GUID.pdf. 
93 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (e)(5)–(6). 
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the family “may question any witnesses,” there is no power for it to sub-
poena witnesses.94
 The HUD regulations were intended to incorporate the due process 
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
where it established the current test for determining what procedural 
due process requires in a hearing regarding the deprivation of public 
benefits.95 In 1984, HUD promulgated a rule amending certain notice 
and hearing requirements for the Section 8 program.96 In its discussion 
of the timing of hearings, HUD noted that a hearing was required prior 
to the termination of a voucher, although a prior hearing was not neces-
sary in making a determination about the size of a unit or determination 
of rent, and stated that this distinction was based on the constitutional 
principles enunciated in Mathews.97 An erroneous decision would not 
have as much of a negative impact in the case of a unit size or rent de-
termination as it would in terminating the entire voucher.98
 The HUD regulations for voucher termination hearings also 
closely align with the requirements laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly.99 In fact, when promulgating a rule revising 
its regulations to permit PHAs to terminate assistance to participants if 
family members engage in drug-related or violent criminal activity, the 
drafters stated, “Under this rule, PHAs must adopt written informal 
pretermination hearing procedures for participants, which fully meet 
the requirements of Goldberg v. Kelly.”100 In response to public com-
ments suggesting that the proposed rule violated due process require-
ments set out in Goldberg because participants did not have the right to 
subpoena witnesses, HUD stated: 
The Department does not agree that these procedures are de-
fective because they do not provide participants with the right 
to subpoena witnesses. . . . The Department has no subpoena 
power to grant either PHAs or participants with respect to 
these matters, nor are they needed to afford procedural due 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Edgecomb v. Hous. Auth. of Vernon, 824 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Conn. 1993) (not-
ing that Section 8 hearing procedures do not provide participants with the right to sub-
poena witnesses); 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (e)(5)–(6). 
95 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
96 Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program; Existing Housing, 49 Fed. Reg. 
12,215, 12,215–16 (Mar. 29, 1984). 
97 See id. at 12,228. 
98 See id. 
99 See 397 U.S. 254, 267–72 (1970). 
100 Section 8 Certificate Program, Moderate Rehabilitation Program and Housing 
Voucher Program, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,538, 28,541 ( July 11, 1990). 
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process in an administrative proceeding for termination of 
housing subsidy. Participants have the right to cross examine 
any witness upon which a PHA relies. As with other informal 
hearings, formal rules of evidence normally do not apply, but 
participants can raise issues challenging the probative value of 
any evidence offered by the PHA.101
Thus, HUD incorporated the reasoning of Mathews in creating hearing 
procedures that would comport with procedural due process, and ex-
plicitly linked the situation of Section 8 voucher holders to that of wel-
fare recipients in Goldberg in determining what procedures were re-
quired.102
B. Cases Finding That an Exclusive Reliance on Uncorroborated Hearsay  
Violates Procedural Due Process 
 Many courts have found Section 8 subsidies to be a property inter-
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the due 
process protections outlined in Goldberg must apply to voucher termina-
tion hearings.103 Courts have disagreed, however, as to whether the pro-
tections articulated in Goldberg, particularly the opportunity to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses, mean that a voucher termination cannot 
be based solely on hearsay evidence without violating due process.104
1. Federal Court Interpretations 
 Some federal district courts have interpreted the HUD regulations 
and Supreme Court precedent to require that a Section 8 termination 
rest on more than just uncorroborated hearsay and to mean that ten-
ants have the right to cross-examine any witnesses on whose statements 
the termination is based.105 In one of the most frequently cited cases, 
the 1993 decision in Edgecomb v. Housing Authority of the Town of Vernon, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the de-
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. 
102 See id. 
103See Davis v. Mansfield Metro. Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d 180, 184–85 (6th Cir. 1984) (not-
ing that “participation in a public housing program is a property interest protected by due 
process”); see also Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The 
government cannot deprive a private citizen of his continued tenancy, without affording 
him adequate procedural safeguards even if public housing could be deemed to be a privi-
lege.”(citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262–63)). 
104 See, e.g., Gammons v. Mass. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 502 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165–
66 (D. Mass. 2007); Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315–17. 
105 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315–17. 
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fendant PHA’s termination of the plaintiffs’ Section 8 assistance vio-
lated HUD regulations where the hearing officer relied solely on hear-
say evidence in the form of a police report and two newspaper arti-
cles.106 The PHA had notified the plaintiffs of its intention to terminate 
their assistance after a family member was arrested and charged with 
conspiracy to sell cocaine, citing HUD regulations allowing PHAs to 
terminate where a family member has engaged in drug-related activi-
ties.107 The hearing officer upheld the decision to terminate based on a 
police report and two newspaper articles that described the family 
member’s arrest.108
 The district court stated that whether the PHA’s termination pro-
cedures complied with HUD regulations “must be judged in light of the 
due process requirements of Goldberg . . . .”109 The court found that the 
plaintiffs’ inability to confront the witnesses against them and the re-
sulting termination decision based entirely on hearsay violated HUD 
regulations allowing parties to question any witnesses and requiring 
PHAs to prove allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.110 The 
only live testimony on behalf of the PHA came from the Section 8 co-
ordinator who had no personal knowledge of the circumstances of the 
family member’s arrest, and the police report was based on discussions 
overheard on a wireless transmitter and information provided by a con-
fidential informant.111 Citing Goldberg, the court stated that although 
termination hearings were informal, the opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses was essential when their statements were the 
basis for the termination; because the police officers and the informant 
were not available at the hearing, the PHA had violated HUD regula-
tions.112
 The district court in Edgecomb took care to note that the 1971 hold-
ing by the Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales did “not contradict 
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 313. The family member, Tammy Edgecomb, had given her brother who did 
not live at the unit a ride to a store. Id. The brother sold cocaine to two men in the store 
parking lot, and Edgecomb was subsequently arrested and charged with conspiracy to sell 
cocaine. Id. 
108 Id. at 315. At the hearing, Tammy Edgecomb testified that “she would not have giv-
en her brother a ride if she had been aware of his purpose.” Id. The plaintiffs’ landlord 
and a parent aide testified that they had not seen evidence of drug-related activity at the 
unit. Id. 
109 Id. at 314. 
110 See id. at 315–16. 
111 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315. 
112 Id. at 316 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269–70). 
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this conclusion.”113 It distinguished that case, which held that a written 
physician’s report could support an adverse determination against a 
claimant for disability benefits despite its hearsay character and the 
claimant’s inability to cross-examine the physician, because there the 
claimant had a right to subpoena the physician but did not.114 The 
court pointed out that Section 8 recipients do not have the right to 
subpoena, and that the recipients could further be distinguished be-
cause they had already been granted a benefit, unlike the claimant in 
Perales who was merely in the application process.115
 Following the reasoning set forth in Edgecomb, several other federal 
courts have found that termination decisions violate HUD regulations 
and procedural due process when they are based on uncorroborated 
hearsay and the family is unable to confront or cross-examine wit-
nesses.116 In 1999, in Litsey v. Housing Authority of Bardstown, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky reached a similar 
decision to that in Edgecomb when it found for a plaintiff who chal-
lenged the termination of her Section 8 voucher because she was not 
given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine her landlord, 
upon whose letters the decision was based.117 The letters were relied on 
as evidence that an unauthorized person was residing with the plaintiff 
in her unit.118 The district court found that the plaintiff had a right to 
question the landlord because his letters were essential to the hearing 
officer’s decision, and stated that the HUD regulations “mandate Plain-
tiff be able to question such a party” or else due process would be vio-
lated.119
 In 2008, in Stevenson v. Willis, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio, held that a plaintiff stated a claim for a violation of 
procedural due process rights where a PHA based its termination deci-
sion solely on hearsay without affording her the right to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses whose statements provided the basis for the 
decision.120 The PHA had terminated the voucher based on the land-
lord’s claim that the plaintiff had damaged the apartment, relying on a 
record summarizing a telephone conversation between a PHA em-
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404–05 (1971)). 
114 Id. (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 404–05). 
115 Id. at 316. 
116 See Litsey v. Hous. Auth. of Bardstown, No. 3:99CV-114-H, 1999 WL 33604017, at *1, 
*6 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 1999). 
117 Id. at *1–3, *6. 
118 Id. at *6. 
119 Id. 
120 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919–20 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
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ployee and the landlord, as well as an agreement between the plaintiff 
and the landlord.121 Because the plaintiff disputed this claim, the court 
found Goldberg required that she have an opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine her landlord, and noted that hearsay statements from a 
potentially biased source had played a dispositive role in the termina-
tion decision.122
2. State Court Interpretations 
 Several state courts have also held that due process and the HUD 
regulations require the right to cross-examine any witnesses relied on 
by the PHA.123 For example, in 2008, in Costa v. Fall River Housing Au-
thority, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a PHA’s termination 
of a plaintiff’s Section 8 housing subsidy violated due process where it 
relied solely on a police report and a newspaper article without giving 
the plaintiff the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the decla-
rants.124 In Costa, the plaintiff was arrested on prostitution-related 
charges, and the PHA moved to terminate.125 At the plaintiff’s informal 
hearing, a grievance panel considered a police report containing 
statements that the plaintiff had offered to have sex with an undercover 
officer for a fee and that she regretted involvement in prostitution, 
along with a newspaper article that editorialized the incident.126 The 
plaintiff denied the statements attributed to her in the police report 
and offered letters of support from her neighbors and doctors.127 The 
panel terminated the plaintiff’s subsidy, stating that its decision was 
based on “the preponderance of evidence of criminal activity,” includ-
ing the police report and the newspaper article.128
                                                                                                                      
121 Id. at 916. 
122 Id. at 919–20. 
123 See Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 881 N.E.2d 800, 809 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 903 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 2009). 
124 Id. On review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the ap-
peals court and held that a PHA may terminate Section 8 benefits based solely on hearsay 
if it is reliable. See infra notes 145–155 and accompanying text. 
125 881 N.E.2d at 803. The PHA sent the plaintiff a termination notice alleging that she 
had violated her obligation under the HUD regulations not to engage in criminal activity 
that “threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of other residents . . . .” Id. 
126 See id. at 804. The court noted that the newspaper article quoted a “[p]olice 
spokesman” discussing evidence the police were going to “try” to find against the plaintiff, 
and that the article’s headline and subheading read, respectively, “Police close house of 
prostitution taking orders online” and “Cops say operation combined latest technology, 
oldest profession.” Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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 The appeals court held that the PHA’s termination of the plain-
tiff’s Section 8 voucher violated due process because it relied on hear-
say evidence without giving the plaintiff the right to cross-examine the 
witnesses against her.129 The court observed that HUD regulations 
guaranteed her the right “to question any witnesses” and that Goldberg 
gave her the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.130 
It stated that, in relying on the hearsay contained in the police report 
and newspaper article, the PHA denied the plaintiff those rights, be-
cause “in effect the police officer and the newspaper reporter testified 
in absentia and beyond the reach of cross-examination.”131 The court 
held that the right under HUD regulations to “question any witnesses” 
becomes meaningless if a PHA can rely on hearsay to terminate a 
voucher where there is no right to subpoena witnesses.132 The appeals 
court was particularly concerned with the PHA’s reliance on the news-
paper article, which it found blatantly untrustworthy because of its pro-
vocative headline and conjecture about future evidence not yet col-
lected.133
C. Cases Finding That an Exclusive Reliance on Uncorroborated Hearsay  
Does Not Violate Procedural Due Process 
 In contrast, other courts have interpreted the language in the 
HUD regulations along with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Goldberg 
and Perales to mean that decisions can be based solely on hearsay and 
that families only have the right to cross-examine those witnesses physi-
cally present at the hearing.134 In reaching their decisions, these courts 
most often rely on the reasoning in Perales that hearsay evidence can 
form a sufficient basis for an adverse administrative decision, and on 
the language of the HUD regulations stating that the rules of evidence 
do not apply in voucher termination hearings.135
                                                                                                                      
129 Id. at 809. 
130 Id. 
131 Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
132 Id. at 809–10 (citing Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315–16). 
133 Id. at 810. The court concluded that “[r]eliance upon a press account for essential 
information will inevitably undermine judicial confidence in the integrity of an adminis-
trative decision.” Id. 
134 See Gammons, 502 F. Supp. at 165–66. 
135 See id. 
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1. Federal Court Interpretations 
 In 2007, in Gammons v. Massachusetts Department of Housing and 
Community Development, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts held that it did not violate due process to base a Section 8 ter-
mination decision on a landlord’s statements about an unauthorized 
visitor even though the plaintiff had been unable to cross-examine the 
landlord.136 The court found that this was “not problematic” because 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Perales, “it is well es-
tablished that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative proceed-
ings, where relevant.”137
 Similarly, in 2007 in Tomlinson v. Machin, the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant PHA where the plaintiff had not been able to cross-examine 
witnesses who were not in attendance at the hearing.138 The district 
court stated that to find otherwise would require a “much more rigid 
evidentiary standard” than that imposed by HUD: 
In a PHA informal hearing, the Hearing Officer is not meant 
to apply the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceed-
ings; thus, it is clear by the plain meaning of § 982.555(a)(5) 
that hearsay statements and copies of documents may be con-
sidered by the Hearing Officer in an informal PHA hearing 
without regard to the rules of evidence.139
2. State Court Interpretations 
 State courts have also concluded that due process and the HUD 
regulations do not require the right to cross-examine witnesses who are 
not physically present at the hearing.140 For example, in 2006, in 
Dowling v. Bangor Housing Authority, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine upheld a Section 8 voucher termination based on a PHA em-
ployee’s handwritten notes of a conversation with the plaintiff’s land-
lord’s son concerning an illegal side deal where the plaintiff agreed to 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 165. 
138 No. 8:05-cv-1880-T-30MSS, 2007 WL 141192, at *1, *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2007). 
139 Id. at *6. It appears the court made a typographical error as “§ 982.555(a)(5)” does 
not exist. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (2009). Instead, the court was most likely referring to 
§ 982.555(e)(5), which provides that families may present evidence and question any wit-
nesses. Id. § 982.555(e)(5). 
140 See Dowling v. Bangor Hous. Auth., 910 A.2d 376, 381, 384 (Me. 2006). 
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pay more than the agreed upon rent to the landlord.141 The tenant ar-
gued that the PHA improperly considered this evidence because it con-
sisted only of hearsay and, therefore, was not sufficient to support a 
termination decision.142 The court rejected this argument, first holding 
that even if the tenant did have a right to cross-examine the landlord’s 
son, she had waived that right by not objecting at the hearing.143 It then 
pointed to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5), which provides that evidence can 
be considered without regard to the rules of evidence, and held that 
consideration of hearsay evidence was therefore permissible.144
 In 2009, in Costa, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
versed, in part, the Massachusetts Appeals Court’s earlier decision, 
holding that the HUD regulations and due process did not prohibit a 
PHA from basing a termination decision either solely or partly on hear-
say evidence, so long as that evidence was reliable.145 The court ob-
served that the Appeals Court opinion could be read to preclude the 
use of any hearsay in a Section 8 termination hearing.146 It stated, how-
ever, that it could discern nothing in the HUD regulations at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(e)(5) that “precludes or even addresses hearsay evidence” 
and that their “clear import” was that the right to “question” any wit-
nesses only applied to those who actually appeared and testified at a 
termination hearing.147 As for procedural due process requirements, 
the court disagreed that Goldberg gave recipients a right to cross-
examine witnesses whom the PHA relied on in making the termination 
decision; instead, it stated that reliability of evidence rather than cross-
examination was the “touchstone” of due process.148
 To determine what due process required, the court then applied 
the three factors laid out by the Supreme Court in Mathews: (1) the pri-
vate interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of that interest and probable value of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest.149 The 
court stated that the private interest involved, defined as the right to 
housing assistance, was not fundamental because it was merely based 
                                                                                                                      
141 See id. at 378–79, 381. 
142 See id. at 381. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. at 384 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5)). 
145 See 903 N.E.2d at 1108; supra notes 124–133 and accompanying text. 
146 See Costa, 903 N.E.2d at 1108. 
147 Id. at 1108–09. 
148 Id. at 1109 (citing Commonwealth v. Given, 808 N.E.2d. 788, 794 n.9 (Mass. 2004) 
(quotation omitted)). 
149 Id. 
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on the state’s decision to provide such assistance.150 It then stated that 
the risk of erroneous deprivation from termination based on hearsay 
would “vary widely with the nature of the hearsay.”151 As for the gov-
ernmental interest, the court noted that the public had an interest in 
timely enforcement of Section 8 program rules to prevent threats to the 
public fisc and public safety, and that enforcement might be delayed or 
prevented if a PHA could rely only on live testimony.152 It also observed 
that the public had an interest in affordable administration of the pro-
gram and that costs could rise substantially if live testimony and cross-
examination were required.153 It added, however, that these additional 
procedures could benefit the public by helping assure a just out-
come.154 The court then concluded that after balancing these factors, 
due process allowed a PHA to base Section 8 termination decisions on 
hearsay evidence, as long as it was reliable.155
D. Basco v. Machin and the Current Unsettled State of the Law 
 Recently, a U.S. court of appeals had the chance to determine for 
the first time whether the HUD regulations and procedural due proc-
ess permit a Section 8 voucher termination based solely on uncorrobo-
rated hearsay evidence.156 In 2008, in Basco v. Machin, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit discussed in dicta potential procedural 
due process difficulties where a termination decision is based solely on 
hearsay, but failed to decide the issue.157 The case is a good example of 
the continuing unsettled state of the law in this area, as other courts 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. at 1109–10. 
151 Id. at 1110. 
152 Costa, 903 N.E.2d at 1110. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. The Supreme Judicial Court provided no further explanation of how it had bal-
anced the three factors against each other. Id. It stated that in reaching its conclusion, it 
declined to follow the decision in Edgecomb, noting the hearsay there had no indicia of 
reliability and that the court had not applied the Mathews balancing test. Id. at 1110 n.18. 
Applying its conclusion to the facts in Costa, the court determined the police report was 
reliable because it contained a detailed factual account based on firsthand observation, 
whereas the newspaper article was not because it relied on an unidentified source. Id. at 
1111. The court could not, however, determine if and to what extent the PHA had based 
its termination decision on the newspaper article, and remanded to the housing court for 
further proceedings regarding this and other defects with the hearing decision. Id. at 
1112–15. 
156 See Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1181–83 (11th Cir. 2008); Brief of Appellants, 
Basco, 514 F.3d 1177 (No. 07-11368). 
157 See Basco, 514 F.3d at 1181–83. 
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have struggled to interpret its dicta in subsequent decisions.158 Its dis-
cussion of the hearsay issue has, however, also opened the door for a 
future decision creating a clear, unifying standard of evidence in these 
cases.159
1. Facts and District Court Decision 
 In Basco, the local PHA terminated a family’s voucher due to the 
presence of an unauthorized resident.160 The tenants appealed from 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant PHA, 
alleging deprivations of their right to procedural due process under 24 
C.F.R. 982.555(e)(5) and (6) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the PHA 
denied them the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against them.161 At the termination hearing the only evidence 
presented by the housing authority consisted of copies of two police 
reports.162 The first report, from February 2005, stated that Mr. Basco 
had given a sworn statement indicating that his stepdaughter had run 
away with an “Emanuel Jones” who was staying at the Basco unit, and 
noted that Emanuel’s address was the same as that of the Bascos’ 
unit.163 The second report was from July 2005 and listed an “Elonzel 
Jones” as an eyewitness to an alleged battery and noted his address as 
that of the Bascos’ unit.164
                                                                                                                      
158 See id.; Ervin v. Hous. Auth. of Birmingham Dist., 281 F. App’x 938, 939 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
159 See Basco, 514 F.3d at 1181–83; Lawyer, supra note 14, at 195 (noting that although 
the Basco court did not decide the hearsay issue, it still addressed it in an authoritative 
manner, and “strongly stated” that the reliance on hearsay testimony in the case was sus-
pect because there was no opportunity for cross-examination). 
160 Basco, 514 F.3d at 1178–79; see 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2) (2009). 
161 Basco, 514 F.3d at 1180; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”); 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(e)(5)–(6) (2009). 
162 Basco, 514 F.3d at 1180. 
163 Id. at 1179. The court pointed out that Mr. Basco’s alleged sworn statement “was not 
contained in or attached to the report.” Id. It later noted that although it did not need to 
reach the issue of whether it was “independently problematic” if the hearing officer relied on 
the report’s description of a sworn statement, “we are troubled by the PHA’s failure to ex-
plain the absence from the police report of the actual statement.” Id. at 1183 n.8. 
164 Id. at 1179. The reports contained not only different spellings of the alleged unau-
thorized resident Jones’s name, but also different birth dates and races. Brief of Appel-
lants, supra note 156. One report listed “Emanuel Lewis Jones” as a “white male” with a 
birth date of “XX/XX/1990,” whereas the other report listed “Elonzel L. Jones” as a “black 
male” with a birth date of “Sep-07-1989.” Id. 
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 Using reasoning similar to that in the Gammons and Tomlinson 
cases, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida had 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant PHA.165 The dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that procedural due process 
rights under the HUD regulations had been violated due to the fact 
that Mrs. Basco did not have the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine the creators of the police reports; the court noted that she was 
given the opportunity to “question any witnesses in attendance at the 
hearing.”166 The court asserted that the plaintiffs were trying to add to 
the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5), stating that the family 
“may question any witnesses” by demanding the right to cross-examine 
“any witnesses” whether they were present at the hearing or not.167 Ap-
plying the reasoning of the Tomlinson decision, the district court was 
not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that they should have a right 
to cross-examine the parties who made the hearsay statements because 
that would be a “much more rigid evidentiary standard” than that re-
quired by HUD or PHA regulations, and it was “clear by the plain 
meaning” of section 982.555(e)(5) that hearsay could be considered 
without regard to the rules of evidence.168
2. Reversal by the Circuit Court 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision, although not because of the hearsay issue.169 
The court first held that the PHA has the burden of persuasion and 
must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that 
an unauthorized person resided at the assisted unit for the length of 
time required to violate the rules.170 It next considered whether due 
                                                                                                                      
 
165 See Basco v. Machin, No. 806CV260T24MSS, 2007 WL 433404, at *7–9 (M.D. Fla. 
Feb. 6, 2007), rev’d, Basco, 514 F.3d at 1177. 
166 Id. at *5. 
167 Id. at *5, *7. 
168 Id. at *7 (citing Tomlinson, 2007 WL 141192, at *6). 
169 See Basco, 514 F.3d at 1178, 1183. 
170 Id. at 1182. The PHA in this case, the Health and Social Services Department of 
Hillsborough County, Florida, had interpreted the HUD regulations concerning unauthor-
ized visitors to place the burden of proof on the tenant. See id. at 1178–79. The PHA’s Ad-
ministrative Plan stated: 
Any person not included on the HUD 50058 who has been in the unit more 
than 15 consecutive days without PHA approval, or a total of 30 days in a 12 
month period, will be considered to be living in the unit as an unauthorized 
household member. . . . The burden of proof that the individual is a visitor rests on 
the family. In the absence of such proof the individual will be considered an 
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process allowed the PHA’s burden of persuasion to be met solely by the 
two hearsay police reports.171 The court observed in dicta that hearsay 
could be sufficient to support an adverse finding if certain factors assur-
ing its underlying reliability and probative value were met.172 The court 
stated that this reliability and probative force depended on four factors: 
(1) the out-of-court declarant’s bias and interest in the result of the 
case; (2) the opposing party’s ability to obtain the information con-
tained in the hearsay before the hearing and subsequently subpoena 
the declarant; (3) the information’s consistency on its face; and (4) the 
recognition by courts of the information’s inherent reliability.173
 The Eleventh Circuit observed that these factors were based on 
those articulated by the Supreme Court in Perales, and contrasted the 
facts of that case with those in Basco.174 The court emphasized that in 
Perales, the Supreme Court took care to point out that it was applying a 
lesser standard than it would if it were considering the use of hearsay in 
benefit termination hearings where Goldberg concerns would apply.175 
In considering the two police reports, the court noted that the second 
factor used to evaluate hearsay evidence—the opposing party’s ability 
to subpoena the declarant— “counsels against basing an adverse ad-
ministrative determination on those hearsay statements” because the 
Bascos could not subpoena the police officers, Emanuel, or Elonzel for 
cross-examination.176 The court, however, reasoned it did not need to 
decide whether that deficiency made the hearing officer’s reliance on 
the police reports a violation of due process.177 Instead, the court 
found the two reports legally insufficient to establish the PHA’s prima 
facie case because they did not prove that Emanuel and Elonzel were 
the same person, and therefore did not support the determination that 
an unauthorized person stayed at the Basco’s unit for the required 
length of time.178
                                                                                                                      
unauthorized member of the household and the PHA will terminate assis-
tance since prior approval was not requested for the addition. 
Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). 
171 Id. at 1182. 
172 See id. (citing U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
173 Id. (citing J.A.M. Builders, Inc. v. Herman, 233 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
174 Id. at 1182–83 (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 402, 406–07). 
175 Basco, 514 F.3d at 1182–83. 
176 Id. at 1183. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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3. Subsequent Interpretations 
 Since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its 
decision in Basco, courts have cited its dicta in support of their deci-
sions concerning Section 8 voucher terminations based on hearsay, 
finding both for and against voucher recipients.179 Five months after 
Basco, the Eleventh Circuit considered a very similar set of facts and 
again vacated the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant PHA, remanding to the district court for further con-
sideration in light of its decision in Basco.180 In 2008, in Ervin v. Housing 
Authority of the Birmingham District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit considered a plaintiff’s claim that her voucher termi-
nation hearing violated her right to due process because the hearing 
officer relied solely on hearsay without adequate indicia of reliability 
and shifted the burden of proof to her.181 The evidence supporting the 
termination consisted of a PHA employee’s testimony describing a let-
ter from the police to the plaintiff’s landlord concerning illegal narcot-
ics found in the unit, a neighbor’s testimony, and the PHA lawyer’s de-
scription of a conversation with the police department regarding an 
arrest and search at the plaintiff’s residence.182
 The court stated that although hearsay could constitute substantial 
evidence in administrative proceedings, it could not conclude on the 
record before it that “factors that assure the underlying reliability and 
probative value of the evidence” were present.183 In fact, it observed 
that the evidence had even less reliability and probative value than the 
two unauthenticated police reports in Basco.184 Therefore, the court 
decided to vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to 
consider whether those factors assuring reliability and probative value 
necessarily were present.185
 On the other hand, in 2008 in Thomas v. Hernando County Housing 
Authority, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
granted the defendant PHA’s motion for summary judgment where the 
termination decision was based in part on a hearsay letter from the 
plaintiff’s landlord regarding an unauthorized resident.186 The court 
                                                                                                                      
179 See Ervin, 281 F. App’x at 939. 
180 See id. 
181 Id. at 941. 
182 Id. at 939–40. 
183 Id. at 942. 
184 Id. 
185 Ervin, 281 F. App’x at 942. 
186 No. 8:07-cv-1902-T-33EAJ, 2008 WL 4844761, at *3, *10 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2008). 
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emphasized that this case was distinguishable from Basco because both 
hearsay and non-hearsay evidence were considered in reaching the de-
cision, and stated that there was no indication that the plaintiff had 
ever tried to have the landlord testify at the hearing.187
 Similarly, in 2008, in Williams v. Housing Authority of the City of Ra-
leigh, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
held that a voucher termination hearing did not violate the plaintiff’s 
due process rights where the decision was based in part on three writ-
ten statements by the plaintiff’s landlord, who was not present at the 
hearing.188 The court distinguished this situation from Basco because 
the PHA had relied on more than just the hearsay evidence in making 
its decision.189 The court added that the plaintiff could have asked to 
continue the hearing so that she could cross-examine her landlord, 
whereas in Basco the hearing officer had not given the plaintiff the op-
tion of continuing the hearing.190
 Two courts also reached differing conclusions in 2009 memoran-
dum opinions after consideration of the Basco decision.191 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Minnesota in its 2009 opinion in Loving v. 
Brainerd Housing and Redevelopment Authority relied on Basco, Edgecomb, 
and Williams in denying a PHA’s summary judgment motion where the 
plaintiffs claimed their voucher terminations violated their due process 
rights because the terminations were based solely on unauthenticated 
hearsay.192 The court noted that Basco recently had discussed due proc-
ess limitations on the extent to which termination decisions could rest 
on hearsay evidence and laid out factors that would help assure the evi-
dence’s reliability and probative value.193 It then pointed to the Edgecomb 
court’s determination that the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses was essential where the witnesses’ declarations 
formed the basis for the termination; the court cited Williams as provid-
ing support for the Edgecomb holding because that case had distin-
                                                                                                                      
187 Id. at *10. 
188 See 595 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629–31 (E.D.N.C. 2008). 
189 See id. at 632. Although the court was not bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent, the 
plaintiff’s reliance on Basco and the court’s efforts to distinguish the case suggests the per-
suasiveness of Basco’s discussion of the hearsay issue in other jurisdictions. 
190 See id. at 632–33. 
191 See infra notes 192–203 and accompanying text. 
192 See Civil No. 08-1349( JRT/RLE), 2009 WL 294289, at *6–9 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2009). 
The hearsay evidence consisted of search warrants, supporting affidavits and evidence 
receipts for items allegedly discovered during the searches. Id. at *1–*2, *6–*7. 
193 Id. at *6. 
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guished Basco when a decision was based on more than hearsay alone.194 
Based on the principles established in these three cases, the court de-
nied the PHA’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ challenge to the use of 
hearsay evidence, as the record was insufficient to allow a review of the 
hearsay documents under Basco or consider the extent to which the 
hearing officer based the termination on the hearsay evidence.195
 In contrast, in 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, in Robinson v. District of Columbia Housing Authority, granted a 
PHA’s summary judgment motion on a similar set of facts.196 The plain-
tiff claimed the termination of her voucher violated due process and 
HUD regulations where the PHA relied on hearsay evidence and did 
not provide her with an opportunity to cross-examine those who gave 
evidence against her, among other allegations.197 The plaintiff argued 
that under the holdings in Basco, as well as Edgecomb and Litsey, the PHA 
improperly relied on a note written by a police officer who arrested an 
alleged unauthorized resident at her address.198 The district court 
quickly disposed of the holdings in Basco and Litsey as unpersuasive be-
cause they had found the hearsay evidence insufficient in substance 
and clarity, rather than reliability.199 It also noted that Basco had not 
reached the issue of whether due process was in fact violated.200 The 
court also distinguished Edgecomb because there the termination was 
based solely on hearsay evidence, whereas the present plaintiff’s termi-
nation was based on other evidence as well.201 It further determined 
that the plaintiff’s reliance on Edgecomb in asserting her right to cross-
examine those who had given evidence against her was unpersuasive.202 
The court stated that Edgecomb “seemingly applies Goldberg too broadly” 
by stating that tenants must be allowed to confront and cross-examine 
any “persons” who supplied information against them, rather than just 
“witnesses.”203
                                                                                                                      
194 Id. 
195 Id. at *6–7. 
196 See Civil Action No. 08-766(RBW), 2009 WL 2993736, at *1–3, *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 
2009). 
197 See id. at *3, *14. 
198 Id. at *2, *4. 
199 Id. at *6. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at *5–*6. 
202 See Robinson, 2009 WL 2993736, at *9. 
203 Id. 
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III. The Exclusive Reliance on Uncorroborated Hearsay 
Evidence in Section 8 Voucher Termination  
Hearings Violates Procedural Due Process 
 Conflicting federal and state court interpretations have created 
much uncertainty as to whether a PHA’s exclusive reliance on hearsay 
evidence in a voucher termination hearing violates a tenant’s proce-
dural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.204 This 
Part argues that the straightforward balancing test articulated in 1976 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge offers the best ap-
proach to finding a clear, comprehensive standard for the level of pro-
cedure required in Section 8 voucher termination hearings.205 It would 
replace the confusingly divergent approaches taken by the state and 
federal courts thus far, which seem to be based on an imprecise appli-
cation of select U.S. Supreme Court cases or reliance on particular sec-
tions of the HUD regulations.206 This Part contends that the line of 
cases requiring hearing procedures closely resembling those set forth 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly is 
most consistent with the type of procedure that would be required after 
applying the Mathews balancing test to Section 8 voucher termina-
tions.207 Those federal and state cases that have held there are no re-
strictions on the use of hearsay in voucher termination hearings based 
on the HUD regulations or the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in 
Richardson v. Perales are flawed because their holdings are inconsistent 
with the procedures that are required under Mathews.208
                                                                                                                      
204 See Gammons v. Mass. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 502 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165–66 (D. 
Mass. 2007); Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 881 N.E.2d 800, 809 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 903 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 2009); see also Lawyer, supra note 14, at 194 (argu-
ing that an “underlying problem” for advocates and voucher holders is the absence of judicial 
precedent, due in part to the fact that federal district courts are free to contradict each 
other). 
205 See 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). Curiously, although the Supreme Court clearly es-
tablished the Mathews test as the means for determining what due process requires in a 
given administrative context and the HUD regulations have also incorporated its analysis, 
only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Costa v. Fall River Housing Authority ap-
plied the Mathews factors to the use of hearsay in voucher terminations. See 903 N.E.2d at 
1109–10. Edgecomb v. Housing Authority of the Town of Vernon, a 1993 Connecticut federal 
district court case, discusses Mathews, but only in the context of notice requirements, not 
hearsay. See 824 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D. Conn. 1993). 
206 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–35; Gammons, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66; Costa, 881 
N.E.2d at 809. 
207 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–35; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); see, e.g., 
Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
208 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); see, e.g., Gammons, 502 F. 
Supp. 2d at 165–66. 
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 First, this Part applies each of the three factors of the Mathews test 
to the context of Section 8 voucher terminations, and under that test 
argues that terminations based exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay 
evidence violate due process and that families must have the right to 
cross-examine witnesses in this type of situation.209 Second, this Part 
urges that HUD should amend its regulations governing the use of evi-
dence in voucher termination hearings to provide specific guidance on 
the use of hearsay evidence and clarify the nature of a family’s right to 
confront and cross-examine adversarial witnesses.210
A. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, Terminations Based Exclusively on 
Uncorroborated Hearsay Evidence Violate Procedural Due Process 
 Although the HUD regulations make clear that PHAs need not 
strictly follow the rules of evidence in voucher termination hearings, 
many courts have recognized that, despite these relaxed standards, the 
exclusive reliance on hearsay evidence can still violate a family’s consti-
tutional rights.211 These courts have most often reached their decisions 
by analogizing the situation of a Section 8 voucher recipient to that of 
the welfare recipients in Goldberg, and thus find that extensive proce-
dural due process is required, including the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses if decisions are based on hearsay evidence alone.212 These courts 
tend to interpret the HUD regulations as requiring that a family be able 
to question any witnesses relied on by the PHA, whether present at the 
hearing or not.213 On the other hand, some courts have found that the 
exclusive reliance on hearsay does not violate a family’s constitutional 
rights.214 These courts often reach their decisions by emphasizing the 
language of the HUD regulations stating that evidence may be consid-
ered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applied 
in judicial proceedings.215 They also claim to find support in the hold-
ing of Perales, which provided that a decision could be based solely on 
hearsay evidence, and thereby find that hearsay alone can form a suffi-
cient basis to terminate a voucher.216 Because hearsay alone is suffi-
                                                                                                                      
209 See infra notes 211–255 and accompanying text. 
210 See infra notes 256–271 and accompanying text. 
211 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315; see also Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 835–36. 
212 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315–17; Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
213 See Edgecomb, 824 F. Supp. at 315–17; Costa, 881 N.E.2d at 809. 
214 See Gammons, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66; Dowling v. Bangor Hous. Auth., 910 A.2d 
376, 384 (Me. 2006). 
215 See Dowling, 910 A.2d at 384; 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2009). 
216 See Gammons, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66. 
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cient, these courts do not interpret the HUD regulations as requiring 
that families be able to question witnesses not present at the hearing.217
 Both of these approaches ultimately are unpersuasive because they 
fail to apply the Supreme Court’s Mathews balancing test.218 The Su-
preme Court has provided this test to enable courts to determine ex-
actly what procedural due process the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires for a particular kind of deprivation of public benefits.219 In 
Mathews, the Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of 
due process” required consideration of three factors: (1) the private 
interest that is affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation under 
current procedures and the probable value of any additional or substi-
tute procedures; and (3) the government’s interest, including the func-
tion it is performing and potential fiscal and administrative burdens 
involved in additional or substitute procedures.220 This test should also 
be applied in the voucher termination context. 
1. The Private Interest Affected by the Official Action 
 Applying the first factor of the Mathews balancing test, the private 
interest of families in maintaining their vouchers is very high, much 
higher than that of the disability benefit recipient in Mathews who was 
found not to have a right to an evidentiary hearing like the one outlined 
in Goldberg.221 The Court in Mathews emphasized the contrast between 
the welfare recipients in Goldberg who lived “on the very margin of sub-
sistence” and that of disability recipients whose eligibility for benefits 
had nothing to do with financial need.222 The Court in Goldberg noted 
that highly influential in its decision was the fact that welfare recipients 
facing termination of their benefits could lose “the very means by which 
to live” and that welfare provided the means to obtain essentials such as 
“housing.”223 Thus, it appears clear that the Goldberg Court would cate-
gorize a housing voucher, which often is the only assistance separating a 
family from homelessness, as one of the means by which a recipient sur-
                                                                                                                      
217 See Dowling, 910 A.2d at 384. 
218 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 865–68 (noting that Ma-
thews marked a turning point after the Goldberg and Perales decisions, and established that 
balancing is required to determine what due process is to be afforded at an administrative 
hearing). 
219 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
220 Id. 
221 See id.; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. 
222 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340. 
223 See 397 U.S. at 264. 
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vives, just as it did welfare—especially in light of the fact that the Court 
specifically mentioned housing in its decision.224 In contrast, the Su-
preme Court in Mathews and Perales emphasized that the level of due 
process required in Goldberg was not owed to a claimant for Social Secu-
rity disability benefits because the potential loss was significantly less 
grave—a claimant has not even started to receive the benefits yet, and 
unlike welfare benefits, disability benefits are not based on financial 
need.225
 For families to be eligible for a Section 8 voucher, they must qual-
ify as low-income; seventy-five percent of new vouchers given out each 
year are to families who subsist at incomes at or below thirty percent of 
the median income in their area.226 The private interest in maintaining 
a voucher is much higher for voucher recipients than for disability-
benefit recipients because a voucher is not an entitlement and a family 
may have a very difficult time ever getting another one.227 Under HUD 
regulations, a PHA has the discretion to deny a family’s application if a 
member was ever previously terminated from the voucher program.228 
Furthermore, even if the family’s application is not denied, they may be 
placed on a waiting list for several years due to funding shortages.229 By 
contrast, because Social Security is an entitlement program, if a recipi-
                                                                                                                      
224 See id. A recent study found that poor families who did not receive housing voucher 
assistance were four times more likely to have lived in a shelter or on the streets than com-
parable families who had vouchers during a five-year period. See Sard, supra note 12, at 10. 
Housing vouchers have been found to be “critically important” for preventing family 
homelessness and for helping families in the shelter system find permanent housing. Id. 
225 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340; Perales, 402 U.S. at 406–07. 
226 Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
227 Id. at 1; see Dunn et al., supra note 13, at 148 (citing Mathews and arguing that the “in-
comparable difficulty” of obtaining a housing voucher requires even greater procedural safe-
guards than were outlined in Goldberg). Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in Costa applied the first Mathews factor to voucher terminations, it summarily dismissed the 
private interest, which it defined as a right to public housing, as only of personal importance 
and not fundamental, as its source was merely the state’s undertaking to provide housing. See 
Costa, 903 N.E.2d at 1109–10. In evaluating the private interest, however, the Court in 
Mathews looked not at fundamentality but at the degree of potential deprivation of the bene-
fit, as measured by the value to the private recipient of the public benefit based on the re-
cipient’s financial need. See 424 U.S. at 340–41. The court in Costa did not examine the de-
gree of potential deprivation and did not compare it to that of welfare recipients as the 
Mathews Court itself had done. See id.; Costa, 903 N.E.2d at 1109–10. 
228 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1) (2008) (“The PHA may at any time deny program as-
sistance for an applicant . . . [i]f a PHA has ever terminated assistance under the program 
for any member of the family.”). 
229 Cf. Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 1. 
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ent of disability benefits loses them, he may reapply right away as long 
as he can show he is eligible.230
 Applying the first factor of the Mathews analysis to the voucher 
termination context shows that there are significant similarities be-
tween Section 8 voucher recipients and the welfare recipients in Gold-
berg.231 The private interest at stake in the voucher termination context 
is also clearly distinguishable from that of Social Security disability 
claimants in Perales, and thus the reasoning in that case supporting ad-
verse administrative decisions based solely on hearsay evidence should 
not apply in the case of voucher hearings.232
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Through Current Procedures 
and the Probable Value of Additional Safeguards 
 Applying the second factor of the Mathews test, the risk of errone-
ous deprivation in the Section 8 voucher termination context is high, 
and certainly higher than it was for the recipient in Mathews.233 The 
Court in Mathews noted that the disability benefit hearings at issue cen-
tered on evidence that is “sharply focused” and “easily documented” 
because such evidence is based on standard, routine, unbiased reports 
completed by trained experts.234 In Perales, the Court was influenced by 
the fact that the hearsay evidence relied on in disability benefit hear-
ings consists of medical reports that are created by experts in a routine 
and unbiased fashion after a thorough examination.235 This kind of 
evidence stands in stark contrast to that often relied upon in voucher 
termination hearings, which could be a call from a neighbor or land-
lord who may have a host of personal biases against the tenant, or a 
hastily created police report which does not involve the level of care or 
expertise applied by a physician in creating a medical report.236
 The kinds of evidence commonly relied on in voucher termination 
hearings—phone calls and letters from landlords or neighbors, and 
police reports and newspaper articles containing hearsay statements— 
hardly classify as standard, routine, or unbiased.237 This evidence is of-
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ten inconsistent, as with the police reports at issue in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Basco v. Machin in 2008, 
where names and other major identifying details conflicted.238 Thus, 
the risk of erroneously terminating a family from the voucher program 
would be greatly decreased by requiring additional procedural safe-
guards, specifically by allowing families to confront and cross-examine 
the declarants of statements used against them and relied on by the 
hearing officer.239
 Significantly, the Court emphasized throughout its decision in Per-
ales that the claimant had the opportunity to subpoena the physicians 
who submitted evidence, but chose not to exercise that right prior to 
his hearing.240 At a voucher termination hearing, however, there is no 
right for a family to subpoena the witnesses against it.241 This difference 
alone should make it almost impossible to apply the reasoning of Perales 
in voucher termination hearings, although courts have continued to 
rely on Perales.242 Future courts should view these sharp distinctions be-
tween the voucher context and that of a Social Security disability claim-
ant as precluding the rule in Perales, which permits the exclusive reli-
ance on hearsay, from applying in voucher termination hearing cases, 
and further find that this difference requires heightened procedures in 
voucher termination hearings.243
 On the other hand, where a decision rests in part on hearsay evi-
dence and in part on other corroborating non-hearsay evidence, the 
value of additional procedures—here the ability to cross-examine the 
hearsay declarant—decreases.244 The risk of an erroneous deprivation 
is lower because the hearsay is not forming the sole basis for the deci-
sion; rather, it is considered in combination with more reliable evi-
dence.245 Thus, the Mathews test would appear to permit procedures for 
voucher termination hearings where hearsay is admissible without 
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cross-examination as long as it does not form the sole basis for a termi-
nation decision.246
3. The Government’s Interest 
 The government’s interest in the voucher termination context, the 
third factor of the Mathews test, is not as strong as the private interest 
combined with the risk of erroneous deprivation.247 Although the gov-
ernment does need to conserve fiscal and administrative resources, that 
interest is counterbalanced by the government’s competing interest in 
ensuring that it runs its program fairly and effectively and fulfills its 
mission of helping low-income families afford safe, decent, and sanitary 
housing.248 The cost of ensuring that a neighbor, landlord, or other 
declarants attend a hearing is certainly less than erroneously causing a 
family to face homelessness as a result of unreliable evidence.249 There 
is thus a strong interest for the government as well as for voucher re-
cipients that vouchers not be terminated improperly.250 Also, making 
hearings more reliable eventually will reduce the government’s fiscal 
and administrative burdens because there likely will be fewer families in 
state and federal courts arguing that termination decisions violated 
their due process rights.251
 PHAs might argue that not being able to rely on any hearsay evi-
dence would place an impossible fiscal and administrative burden on 
them to support their termination decisions.252 Requiring the right to 
confront and cross-examine, however, would not have to mean that 
hearsay could never be admitted—only that a decision could not be 
based exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay evidence without affording 
this right.253 This strikes the proper balance between the government 
interest and the private interest, and is not unduly burdensome on 
PHAs because hearsay could be considered without requiring cross-
examination as long as there was some other corroborating evidence, 
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not necessarily from the hearsay declarant.254 Thus, despite the fact that 
the HUD regulations state that evidence may be considered without ref-
erence to the normal evidentiary rules, the application of the Mathews 
test to voucher termination hearings counsels that an evidentiary hear-
ing like the one required in Goldberg is required by due process, includ-
ing the right of families to confront and cross-examine any witnesses 
against them where a decision is based entirely on hearsay evidence.255
B. Proposed Amendment of HUD Regulations 
 In addition to courts adopting a standard that clearly states that 
the exclusive reliance on uncorroborated hearsay evidence is insuffi-
cient to support a voucher termination, an amendment to the HUD 
regulations governing evidence in voucher termination hearings would 
dramatically reduce current confusion and help ensure that PHAs con-
sistently respect families’ constitutional rights.256 The regulations cur-
rently state: “The PHA and the family must be given the opportunity to 
present evidence, and may question any witnesses.”257 The phrase “may 
question any witnesses” allows for two vastly different interpretations: 
First, that the family only has a right to question any witnesses who are 
physically present at the hearing. And second, that the family has a 
right to question any witnesses on whose statements the PHA relies, and 
thus if these witnesses are not physically present for questioning, then 
the PHA cannot rely on their statements to support a termination.258 
The regulation’s vague language is problematic because it allows PHAs 
to circumvent a family’s constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against them merely by not producing the witnesses, 
or hearsay declarants, at the hearing.259
 PHAs and courts have determined that the HUD regulations 
should not be interpreted as requiring PHAs to produce witnesses on 
whose statements they want to rely at the hearing; rather, such regula-
tions simply mean that if PHAs call witnesses at the hearing, the family 
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has the right to question them.260 This PHA practice, however, violates 
families’ constitutional right to due process under the Supreme Court’s 
test in Mathews, as discussed above.261 Furthermore, the language of the 
HUD regulations so clearly tracks that of the procedural requirements 
for hearings laid out in Goldberg, it seems evident that the regulations 
should be interpreted as granting the same type of rights as those out-
lined in that decision.262
 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court did not say that welfare recipients 
must be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine any wit-
nesses the welfare department chooses to produce at the hearing, but 
rather “the witnesses relied on by the department.”263 When a PHA at-
tempts to base a termination decision entirely on hearsay evidence, 
clearly those declarants are “relied on.”264
 This interpretation of the HUD regulations is also supported by 
HUD officials’ own comments when they revised Section 8 voucher 
regulations in 1990.265 The officials wrote, “[u]nder this rule, PHAs 
must adopt written informal pre-termination hearing procedures for 
participants, which fully meet the requirements of Goldberg v. Kelly.”266 
HUD went on to state, “Participants have the right to cross examine any 
witness upon which a PHA relies.”267 Thus, HUD’s regulations should 
be interpreted to mean that “any witnesses” applies to anyone upon 
whose statements a termination decision relies.268
 The fact that some courts and PHAs do not interpret the regulations 
this way suggests that HUD should seriously consider amending them to 
clarify that a family must be allowed to question any witnesses whose 
statements are relied upon in making the termination decision, whether 
or not the PHAs choose to invite them to the hearing.269 HUD could ac-
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complish this by amending the regulation at section 982.555(e)(5) to 
read: 
The PHA and the family must be given the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence, and to question any witnesses. The family must 
be allowed to question witnesses relied on by the PHA in mak-
ing its decision, and if any of these witnesses are not available 
for questioning at the hearing, the hearing officer may not base 
the decision exclusively on evidence from those witnesses.270
This would provide much-needed clarity and thus help ensure that 
PHAs and courts applying the HUD regulations afford families consti-
tutionally adequate procedures at every termination hearing.271
Conclusion 
 The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program provides necessary 
housing assistance to over two million low-income families in the United 
States. Each year, many families have their vouchers terminated by the pub-
lic housing agencies that administer the Section 8 program based solely on 
uncorroborated hearsay evidence. Courts have arrived at widely differing 
conclusions as to whether the HUD regulations governing the Section 8 
voucher program and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment permit a voucher termination based exclusively on hearsay, 
and whether families have the right to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses who made the hearsay statements if they are not in attendance at the 
termination hearing. Applying the balancing test laid out by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, it is evident that Section 8 voucher ter-
minations may not be based exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay evi-
dence unless families are afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against them. Courts should adopt this standard for 
voucher termination hearings, and HUD should amend its regulations to 
make these requirements explicit. This will protect the procedural due 
process rights of families in the Section 8 voucher program, ensuring that 
they are not terminated erroneously and thus do not face homelessness or 
other hardship on the basis of uncorroborated evidence. 
Margaretta E. Homsey 
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